The purpose of this paper is to use an anaphoric notion of presupposition for solving the problem of zero argument anaphora. Since Shopen (1973) it has been known that many missing arguments have an anaphoric interpretation, but it has not been known how this interpretation arises. I argue that these arguments are involved in presuppositions. On an anaphoric account of presuppositions as in van der Sandt (1992) or Kamp and Roßdeutscher (1992), it can be shown that the zero arguments acquire (...) an anaphoric interpretation through the presuppositions. The analysis rests on the principle that the Discourse Representation Structure for the presupposition is proper, so that the discourse referents for the zero arguments are in its universe and must be anchored to discourse referents in the context. (shrink)

I present an analysis of Free Choice Items (FCIs), based on Scandinavian, where FCIs are complex and distinct from polarity sensitive items. Scandinavian FCIs are argued to have two components. One is a universal quantifying into modal contexts. The other is an operator mapping a type (s,t) expression onto itself, adjoining to the closest type t or (s,t) expression. Thus invoking Intensional Functional Application, this operator requires the presence of a modal in the scope of the universal quantifier. Facts concerning (...) ‘essential connections’ and ‘existential import’ are accounted for by assuming that the FC determiner has the option of acting like a quantifier. (shrink)

Some propositional attitude verbs require that the complement contain some “subjective predicate”. In terms of the theory proposed by Lasersohn, these verbs would seem to identify the “judge” of the embedded proposition with the matrix subject, and there have been suggestions in this direction. I show that it is possible to analyze these verbs as setting the judge and doing nothing more; then according to whether a judge index or a judge argument is assumed, unless the complement contains a subjective (...) predicate, the whole matrix is redundant or there is a type conflict. I further show that certain clear facts argue for assuming a judge argument which can be filled by a contextually salient entity–or by the subject of a subjective attitude verb. (shrink)

How questions are understudied in philosophy and linguistics. They can be answered in very different ways, some of which are poorly understood. Jaworski identifies several types: ‘manner’, ‘method, means or mechanism’, ‘cognitive resolution’, and develops a logic designed to enable us to distinguish among them. Some key questions remain open, however, in particular, whether these distinctions derive from an ambiguity in how, from differences in the logical structure of the question or from contextual underspecification. Arguing from two classes of responses, (...) adverbs and by gerunds, I give the answer that the logical structure of the question is indeed relevant: loosely, manners are adjuncts but methods are arguments. (shrink)

Two main methods for analysing de re readings of definite descriptions in intensional contexts coexist: that of evaluating the description in the actual world, whether by means of scope, actuality operators, or non-local world binding, and that of substituting another description, usually one expressing a salient or ‘vivid’ acquaintance relation to an attitude holder, prior to evaluation. Recent work on so-called descriptive indexicals suggests that contrary to common assumptions, both methods are needed, for different ends. This paper aims to show (...) that there is indeed a division of labour between the two methods of analysis and to identify criteria for choosing among alternative ways to model the second, substitutional method. (shrink)

This article surveys and discusses the core points of contact between notions of information structure and notions of presupposition. Section 1 is devoted to the ‘weak’ presuppositional semantics for focus developed by Mats Rooth, describing its properties with regard to verification and accommodation and showing that it can successfully account for a wide range of phenomena. Section 2 examines the stronger thesis that focus–background structures give rise to existential presuppositions, and finds the counterarguments that have been raised to carry considerable (...) weight. Section 3 looks into the relationship between Givenness and run-of-the-mill presuppositions, finding that this relationship is looser than might be expected, mainly because a presupposition may be in need of focus marking instead of givenness marking. (shrink)

The type of mood or tense marking that causes counterfactuality inferences—as figuring prominently, but far from exclusively, in counterfactual conditionals—has not yet received a comprehensive and compositional analysis. Focusing on four languages, the paper presents under-appreciated facts and a novel theory where the mood serves to activate alternatives to modal operators, particularly one: the identity operator, often giving rise to counterfactual implicatures.

The meaning of have is notoriously difficult to define; sometimes it seems to denote possession, but often, it seems to denote nothing, only to complicate composition. This paper focuses on the cases where have embeds a small clause, proposing that all it accomplishes is abstraction, turning the small clause into a predicate. This analysis is extended to the cases where have appears to embed DPs: These objects are interpreted as small clauses as well, with implicit predicates denoting possession or—with relational (...) nouns—nothing. (shrink)

Broad focus (or informational integration or nonautonomy) is lexically and contextually constrained, but these constraints are not well understood. On a standard theory of focus interpretation, the presupposition of a broad focus is verified whenever those of two narrow foci are. I argue that to account for cases where two narrow foci are preferred, it is necessary to assume that broad focus competes with two narrow foci and implicates the opposite of what they presuppose. Central constraints on thetic statements are (...) thus accounted for in an Optimality Theory (OT) enriched Alternative Semantics. (shrink)

This paper aims at an account of the German “reportive subjunctive”, where the mood signals that the proposition is the object of an utterance report. The report can be explicit in the sentence or in the context, or more or less implicit. We interpret these uses as a more or less local verification or accommodation of a presupposition introduced by the subjunctive, thus accounting for a range of facts and contributing to the theory of presuppositions.

Indefinites face competition at two levels: Presupposition and content. The antipresupposition hypothesis predicts that they signal the opposite of familiarity, or uniqueness, namely, novelty, or non-uniqueness. At the level of descriptive content, they are pressured from two sides: definites expressing identity and another phrases expressing difference, and Gricean reasoning predicts that indefinites signal both difference and identity and are infelicitous when definites and another phrases are felicitous. However, occasionally a space opens between the and another, for a to fill. This (...) is in part due to conditions handicapping the or another semantically, in part to another’s phonological handicap. The division of labor between determiners in the field of difference and sameness is thus the result of an intricate competition. We model this competition in a version of game-theoretic pragmatics. (shrink)

Current dynamic epistemic logics for analyzing effects of informational events often become cumbersome and opaque when common knowledge is added for groups of agents. Still, postconditions involving common knowledge are essential to successful multi-agent communication. We propose new systems that extend the epistemic base language with a new notion of ‘relativized common knowledge’, in such a way that the resulting full dynamic logic of information flow allows for a compositional analysis of all epistemic postconditions via perspicuous ‘reduction axioms’. We also (...) show how such systems can deal with factual alteration, rather than just information change, making them cover a much wider range of realistic events. After a warm-up stage of analyzing logics for public announcements, our main technical results are expressivity and completeness theorems for a much richer logic that we call LCC. This is a dynamic epistemic logic whose static base is propositional dynamic logic (PDL), interpreted epistemically. This system is capable of expressing all model-shifting operations with finite action models, while providing a compositional analysis for a wide range of informational events. This makes LCC a serious candidate for a standard in dynamic epistemic logic, as we illustrate by analyzing some complex communication scenarios, including sending successive emails with both ‘cc’ and ‘bcc’ lines, and other private announcements to subgroups. Our proofs involve standard modal techniques, combined with a new application of Kleene’s theorem on finite automata, as well as new Ehrenfeucht games of model comparison. (shrink)

Perceptual organization comprises a wide range of processes such as perceptual grouping, figure-ground organization, filling-in, completion, and perceptual switching. The Oxford Handbook of Perceptual Organization provides a broad and extensive review of the current literature, written in an accessible form for scholars and students.

This paper presents a simple decidable logic of functional dependence LFD, based on an extension of classical propositional logic with dependence atoms plus dependence quantifiers treated as modalities, within the setting of generalized assignment semantics for first order logic. The expressive strength, complete proof calculus and meta-properties of LFD are explored. Various language extensions are presented as well, up to undecidable modal-style logics for independence and dynamic logics of changing dependence models. Finally, more concrete settings for dependence are discussed: continuous (...) dependence in topological models, linear dependence in vector spaces, and temporal dependence in dynamical systems and games. (shrink)

Ontology and theology cannot be combined if ontology excludes non physical causes. This paper examines some possibilities for ontology to be combined with theology in so far as non physical causes are permitted. The paper builds on metaphysical findings that shows that separate ontological domains can interact causally indirectly via interfaces. As interfaces are not universes a first universe is allowed to be caused by an interface without violating the principle of causal closure of any universe. Formal theology can therefore (...) be based on the assumption that the (first) universe is caused by God if God is defined as the first cause. Given this, formal theology and science can have the same ontological base. (shrink)

Preference is a basic notion in human behaviour, underlying such varied phenomena as individual rationality in the philosophy of action and game theory, obligations in deontic logic (we should aim for the best of all possible worlds), or collective decisions in social choice theory. Also, in a more abstract sense, preference orderings are used in conditional logic or non-monotonic reasoning as a way of arranging worlds into more or less plausible ones. The field of preference logic (cf. Hansson [10]) studies (...) formal systems that can express and analyze notions of preference between various sorts of entities: worlds, actions, or propositions. The art is of course to design a language that combines perspicuity and low complexity with reasonable expressive power. In this paper, we take a particularly simple approach. As preferences are binary relations between worlds, they naturally support standard unary modalities. In particular, our key modality ♦ϕ will just say that is ϕ true in some world which is at least as good as the current one. Of course, this notion can also be indexed to separate agents. The essence of this language is already in [4], but our semantics is more general, and so are our applications and later language extensions. Our modal language can express a variety of preference notions between propositions. Moreover, as already suggested in [9], it can “deconstruct” standard conditionals, providing an embedding of conditional logic into more standard modal logics. Next, we take the language to the analysis of games, where some sort of preference logic is evidently needed ([23] has a binary modal analysis different from ours). We show how a qualitative unary preference modality suffices for defining Nash Equilibrium in strategic games, and also the Backward Induction solution for finite extensive games. Finally, from a technical perspective, our treatment adds a new twist. Each application considered in this paper suggests the need for some additional access to worlds before the preference modality can unfold its true power.. (shrink)

Standard definitions of causal closure focus on where the causes in question are. In this paper, the focus is changed to where they are not. Causal closure is linked to the principle that no cause of another universe causes an event in a particular universe. This view permits the one universe to be affected by the other via an interface. An interface between universes can be seen as a domain that violates the suggested account of causal closure, suggesting a view (...) in which universes are causally closed whereas interfaces are not. On this basis, universes are not affected by other universes directly but rather indirectly. (shrink)

Rational agents base their actions on information from observation, inference, introspection, or other sources. But this information comes in different kinds, and it is usually handled by different logical mechanisms. We discuss how to integrate external ‘updating information’ and internal ‘elucidating information’ into one system of dynamic epistemic logic, by distinguishing two basic informational actions: ‘bare seeing’ versus ‘conscious realization’.

Dynamic update of information states is a new paradigm in logicalsemantics. But such updates are also a traditional hallmark ofprobabilistic reasoning. This note brings the two perspectives togetherin an update mechanism for probabilities which modifies state spaces.

The interface of logic and philosophy is diverse, and has always been so. Understanding the interplay raises issues on which some philosophers have strong a priori views. My own preference as a working logician is to proceed by actual history of ideas, something still largely to be written for modern logic. I shall present a few lines connecting logic and philosophy around the theme of implication and consequence, and show how rich the agenda is as it keeps evolving with contributions (...) from many disciplines. This is a light survey paper, but I supply references for readers who want to see more of the nitty-gritty details. (shrink)

After more than a century of research on glycolysis, we have detailed descriptions of its molecular organization, but despite this wealth of knowledge, linking the enzyme properties to metabolic pathway behavior remains challenging. These challenges arise from multi‐layered regulation and the context and time dependence of component functions. However, when viewed as a system that functions according to the principles of supply and demand, a simplifying theoretical framework can be applied to study its regulation logic and to assess the coherence (...) of experimental interpretations. These principles are universally applicable, as they emphasize the common metabolic tasks of glycolysis: the provision of free‐energy carriers, and precursors for biosynthesis and stress‐related compounds. Here we will review the regulation of multi‐tasking by glycolysis and consider how an understanding of this central metabolic pathway can be pursued using general principles, rather than focusing on the biochemical details of constituent components. (shrink)

This paper draws on the emerging field of innovation ethics to complement the more established field of responsible innovation by focusing on key ethical issues raised by technological innovations. One key limitation of influential frameworks of RI is that they tend to neglect some key ethical issues raised by innovation, as well as major normative dimensions of the notion of responsibility. We explain how IE could enrich RI by stressing the more important role that ethical analysis should play in RI. (...) We focus on two transversal issues of IE: the issue of redrawing conceptual boundaries, especially the topic of the artificialization of the world, and the issue of responsibility, especially the notion of total responsibility. We address these two issues from the thematic perspective of IE, thereby generating lessons learnt for RI. These two examples are taken as illustrations and blueprint of the dialogue that should take place between the two fields. (shrink)

IntroductionBorderline personality disorder patients are often subjected to inpatient compulsory care due to suicidal behaviour. However, inpatient care is usually advised against as it can have detrimental effects, including increased suicidality.AimTo investigate what motives psychiatrists have for treating borderline personality disorder patients under compulsory care.Materials and MethodsA questionnaire survey was distributed to all psychiatrists and registrars in psychiatry working at mental health emergency units or inpatient wards in Sweden. The questionnaire contained questions with fixed response alternatives, with room for comments, (...) about the respondents’ motives for practising compulsory care of borderline personality disorder patients. The responses were analysed quantitatively with descriptive statistics, and comments were analysed with qualitative descriptive content analysis.ResultsThe psychiatrists’ views were divided on when it was justified to treat borderline personality disorder patients under compulsory care, as were their views on borderline personality disorder patients’ decision competence. When there was an assessed risk of harm, 53% were positive to compulsory care of decision-competent borderline personality disorder patients and another 31% because they considered the patients to be decision incompetent in such situations. Adding the risk of harm caused many respondents to alter their assessment of the patient from decision competent to decision incompetent.ConclusionThe large variations in doctors’ opinions indicate that the care of borderline personality disorder patients is arbitrary. Further, the assessed risk of harm increases the use of compulsory care, even though such care is advised against in clinical guidelines, has questionable legal support, and could lead to an increased suicide risk over time. (shrink)

Hainan, is the only free trade port that also exudes quintessence of the culture of China. Tourism is one of Hainan's most lucrative industries. On the one hand, the regional economy is flourishing and on the other hand, the economy is facing unprecedented impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the affected global market environment, this study investigates Hainan residents' acceptance intentions, or tolerance, of tourists. Here, based on the theory of reasoned action, which includes “subjective norm” combined with (...) “trust,” “perceived risk,” and “perceived value.” Using “resident attitude” as a mediator, theoretical research frameworks were developed. A total of 447 valid responses were collected using online and paper-copy questionnaires distributed to Hainan residents from 15 July 2021 to 10 November 2021. The data from the questionnaires were used for three analyses namely, descriptive statistical analysis, measurement model verification, and structural equation modeling analysis. Findings show a positive effect of trust on residents' attitudes in Hainan; perceived value and subjective norm showed a positive effect on resident acceptance intentions for tourism; the perceived risk of residents showed a more negative effect on attitudes toward tourists, but the influence was small. Finally, through the results of the study, theoretical and practical implications in a post-pandemic era are discussed. (shrink)

We propose strategic games wherein the strategies consist of players asking each other questions and answering those questions. We study simplifications of such games wherein two players simultaneously ask each other a question that the opponent is then obliged to answer. The motivation for our research is to model conversation including the dynamics of questions and answers, to provide new links between game theory and dynamic logics of information, and to exploit the dynamic/strategic structure that, we think, lies implicitly inside (...) epistemic models for epistemic languages, and to make that structure an explicit subject of logical study. Our main contributions are: the notion of a two-person question-answer game with information goals, the existence and computation of equilibria for these games, the correspondence with Bayesian games and their equilibria, and a connection between logic and game theory namely the existence of equilibria for positive goal formulae. (shrink)

Classical epistemic logic describes implicit knowledge of agents about facts and knowledge of other agents, based on semantic information. The latter is produced by acts of observation or communication, that are described well by dynamic epistemic logics. What these logics do not describe, however, is how significant information is also produced by acts of inference – and key axioms of the system merely postulate “deductive closure”. In this paper, we take the view that all information is produced by acts, and (...) hence we also need a dynamic logic of inference steps showing what effort on the part of the agent makes a conclusion explicit knowledge. Strong omniscience properties of agents should be seen not as static idealizations, but as the result of dynamic processes that agents engage in. This raises two questions: (a) how to define suitable information states of agents and matching notions of explicit knowledge, (b) how to define natural processes over these states that generate new explicit knowledge. To this end, we extend earlier epistemic “awareness models” into a dynamic system that includes acts of public observation, but also adding and dropping formulas from the currently ‘entertained’ set, we give a completeness theorem, and we show how this dynamics updates explicit knowledge. Similar ideas have been proposed before, but they were restricted to update with factual propositions; our new dynamic system applies to arbitrary formulas. We also extend our approach to multi-agent scenarios where awareness changes may happen privately. Finally, we mention further directions and related approaches. (shrink)

In this dialogue, Mileva and Albert start to talk about physics and its subject matter, the physical. They end up in a situation that permits causal dependence between separate ontological domains. In this possible world, they continue talking. First, they Socratically agree that the physical is physical and only physical. Then, they call the physical an ontologically homogeneous domain. They then generalise the principle that the physical is causally unaffected by anything non-physical, into the principle that ontologically homogeneous domains do (...) not cause ontologically homogeneous domains. From a modern point of view talking about black hole singularities, they continue discussing the Chandrasekhar limit and the collapse of the physical laws as we know them. Mileva carries a burden and Albert stands up and carries it with her. The burden is an implication of the generalised principle. Relying on parsimony, only ontologically homogeneous domains are forbidden to cause ontologically homogeneous domains. This leaves the door open for ontologically heterogeneous domains to cause ontologically homogeneous domains. Also relying on parsimony, only ontologically homogeneous domains are forbidden to be caused by ontologically homogeneous domains and this allows ontologically heterogeneous domains to be caused by ontologically homogeneous domains. Ontologically heterogeneous domains, thus, are allowed to causally link ontologically homogeneous domains. Albert realises that the mathematical could qualify as an ontologically homogeneous domain and that the theoretical difficulties that are foreseen beyond the Chandrasekhar limit could be addressed by expanding physics into a context that contains also an ontologically heterogeneous domain. The theoretical difficulties beyond the Chandrasekhar limit would be due to an emergent mathematical-physical domain. Mileva concludes that Albert’s theory is not faulty but regional. A global theory would have to include the explanation of the mathematical-physical. (shrink)

Increasingly firm rejections of the distinction between positive and negative human rights as incoherent have created a gap between theory and practice, as well as tensions within legal doctrinal and philosophical literature. This article argues that the distinction can be preserved by means of a structural account of the interaction of duties within human rights, anchored in case law on the right to freedom of assembly in Article 11, the right to free elections in Article 3 of Protocol 1, and (...) the right to security as enshrined in Articles 2, 3, 5, and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. (shrink)

Understanding human behaviour involves "why"'s as well as "how"'s. Rational people have good reasons for acting, but it can be hard to find out what these were and how they worked. In this Note, we discuss a few ways in which actions, preferences, and expectations are intermingled. This mixture is especially clear with the well-known solution procedure for extensive games called 'Backward Induction'. In particular, we discuss three scenarios for analyzing behaviour in a game. One can rationalize given moves as (...) revealing agents' preferences, one can also rationalize them as revealing agents' beliefs about others, but one can also change a predicted pattern of behaviour by making promises. All three scenarios transform given games to new ones, and we prove some results about their scope. A more general view of relevant game transformations would involve dynamic and epistemic game logics. Finally, our analysis describes and disentangles matters: but it will not tell you what to do! (shrink)